

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable• ROUTINE
IN TELEPOUCH

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DIST 18 DECEMBER 1967

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

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SUBJECT SUMMARY OF VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN KHANH HOA PROVINCE
DURING NOVEMBER 1967

ACQ

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SOURCE

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SUMMARY. THE INCREASED LEVEL OF VIET CONG /VC/ MILITARY AND
TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN KHANH HOA PROVINCE WHICH WAS NOTED LAST
MONTH CONTINUED IN NOVEMBER. A PROVINCE-LEVEL MEETING OF VC
CADRES AND MILITARY LEADERS WAS HELD, BUT NO RELIABLE INFORMA-
TION IS YET AVAILABLE CONCERNING THE MEETING. VC PROPAGANDA HAS
SPREAD EXAGGERATED OR COMPLETELY FALSE REPORTS OF LARGE NEW VC
MILITARY UNITS MOVING INTO KHANH HOA IN AN EFFORT TO DEMORALIZE

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GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM PERSONNEL. THE PRINCIPAL VC PROBLEMS
 CONTINUE TO BE INADEQUATE LOCAL RECRUITMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE
 PERSONNEL AND AN INADEQUATE FOOD SUPPLY. END SUMMARY.

POLICY

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[REDACTED]
 THE VIET CONG /VC/ KHANH HOA PROVINCE
 COMMITTEE HELD A MEETING IN THE LATTER PART OF NOVEMBER, ATTENDED
 BY CADRES AND MILITARY UNIT COMMANDERS FROM ALL SECTIONS OF THE
 PROVINCE. IT WAS VARIOUSLY DESCRIBED AS A REGULAR PROVINCE
 COMMITTEE MEETING, A SPECIAL MEETING TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS AND
 POLICY, AND A COMBINATION OF BOTH. [REDACTED] THE
 MEETING WAS CALLED TO RESOLVE SERIOUS CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE VC
 AND REGULAR NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY /NVA/ UNITS. [REDACTED]

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2. THE VC IN KHANH HOA PROVINCE HAVE ADOPTED A NEW
 PROPAGANDA TACTIC, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
 THAT BATTALION- AND REGIMENT-SIZE UNITS WERE REINFORCING

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THE KHANH HOA VC FORCES. THE PROPAGANDA STRESSED A NEW UNITED
 THEME AND ADVISED VILLAGERS TO DIG TRENCHES FOR PROTECTION DURING
 FUTURE BATTLES. COMBINED WITH INCREASED VC ACTIVITY OF THE PAST
 TWO MONTHS, THE PROPAGANDA WAS CONVINCING. NO NEW VC UNIT,
 HOWEVER, HAS YET BEEN IDENTIFIED IN KHANH HOA. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THE PRESENCE OF ONE INFILTRATION GROUP
 OF ABOUT TWO HUNDRED MEN WHICH WAS TO PROVIDE REPLACEMENTS FOR
 EXISTING UNITS. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THE VC HAVE SPREAD THIS PROPAGANDA TO
 DEMORALIZE GVN FORCES, PARTICULARLY REGIONAL FORCES AND
 POPULAR FORCES, WHILE THE VC CONDUCT THEIR AUTUMN-WINTER CAMPAIGN.
 OPERATIONS

3. THE INCREASED AMOUNT OF VC MILITARY ACTIVITY NOTED LAST
 MONTH CONTINUED IN NOVEMBER, BUT IT WAS MORE CLEARLY ASSOCIATED
 WITH FOOD AND SUPPLY SHORTAGES. THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF A
 COORDINATED VC ATTACK ON TWO VILLAGES IN DIEN KHANH DISTRICT
 /INVOLVING SOME 500 MEN/ WAS THE COLLECTION OF RICE. [REDACTED]

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THE VC COLLECTED ALL AVAILABLE RICE. HALF OF THEIR FORCES THEN
 WITHDREW TO THE MOUNTAINS WITH THE RICE WHILE THE OTHERS COVERED

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THEIR RETREAT. THIS OPERATION COST THE VC 60 KILLED AND 18 CAPTURED.

4. ATTACKS ON LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS CONTINUED WITH FOUR VC ATTEMPTS TO MINE TRAINS. ONLY TWO WERE SUCCESSFUL. TWO BRIDGES ON HIGHWAY ONE AND ANOTHER ON HIGHWAY 21 WERE DAMAGED BY MINES. THERE WAS ONE SNIPING INCIDENT AND ONE MINE WAS DETONATED BY A VEHICLE ON HIGHWAY ONE. ON 28 NOVEMBER THE VC CLOSED THE ROAD TEMPORARILY FOR MILITARY SECURITY REASONS.

5. EXTENSIVE TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN NHA TRANG CONTINUED FOR THE FOURTH MONTH. EIGHT MINES OR EXPLOSIVE CHARGES WERE DETONATED WITHIN THE CITY, ALTHOUGH ONLY ONE CAUSED SERIOUS CASUALTIES. IN ADDITION, THE NHA TRANG AIRFIELD WAS MORTARED ON 26 NOVEMBER AND A SHIP IN THE HARBOR WAS SLIGHTLY DAMAGED BY A MINE ON 3.3(h)(2)

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3 NOVEMBER. TWO PERSONS

WERE OFFERED MONEY, IN ONE CASE VN\$70,000 /US\$593.22/, TO PLANT EXPLOSIVES AT U.S. OR GVN INSTALLATIONS.

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THE VC NHA TRANG CITY COMMITTEE HELD A MEETING ON 17 NOVEMBER TO EVALUATE SABOTAGE

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ACTIVITIES AND TO DRAFT PLANS FOR INCREASING SAPPER UNITS AND
FOR RECRUITING VIETNAMESE LABORERS ON U. S. BASES FOR SABOTAGE
MISSIONS. COMMENT-- IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS MEETING IS
IDENTICAL WITH THAT OF THE PROVINCE COMMITTEE MEETING DESCRIBED IN
PARAGRAPH ONE./

6. AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO ELIMINATE THE VC TAX COLLECTION
POINT ON HIGHWAY 21. AN RF
COMPANY SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING SURVEILLANCE OF A SIX-MAN VC
UNIT AT THE CHECKPOINT, BUT NO CONTACT WAS INITIATED IN THE HOPE
OF EVENTUALLY TRAPPING A LARGER GROUP OF VC.

ESTIMATED THAT THE VC OBTAINED ENOUGH
MONEY, FOOD AND SUPPLIES THROUGH THIS CHECKPOINT TO SUPPORT A
BATTALION.

PROBLEMS

7. THE MAIN VC PROBLEMS IN KHANH HOA PROVINCE CONTINUE TO BE
PERSONNEL AND FOOD.

VC RECRUITMENT IN KHANH HOA
IS INADEQUATE.

THE VC REPLACE MILITARY
CASUALTIES WITH NVA PERSONNEL OR REINFORCEMENTS FROM OTHER

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PROVINCES. HOWEVER, THE VC DO NOT APPEAR SUCCESSFUL IN REPLACING
CADRE LOSSES, AND [REDACTED] SERIOUS CADRE SHORTAGES AT 3.3(h)(2)
DISTRICT LEVELS. THE VC APPEAR TO BE CONCENTRATING, WITH SOME
SUCCESS, ON MAINTAINING ADEQUATE STAFFS IN THE MOST IMPORTANT
DISTRICTS- HOWEVER, IN AT LEAST THREE OF THE EIGHT DISTRICTS,
MANY SECTIONS OF THE DISTRICT COMMITTEES ARE COMPLETELY WITHOUT
PERSONNEL. ALL SECTIONS OF THE PROVINCE COMMITTEE APPEAR TO BE
COMPLETELY STAFFED. [REDACTED] 3.3(h)(2)
[REDACTED] THE VC HAVE ATTEMPTED TO RECRUIT PERSONNEL FOR THE VC
INFRASTRUCTURE FROM AMONG FORMER POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DELINQUENT VC
MEMBERS.

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